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Recent Cases
CIVIL PROCEDURE-CLASS ACTIONSCLOSING THE DOORS TO THE FEDERAL COURTS
Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co.'
The action was commenced by four named owners of property on Lake
Champlain on behalf of themselves and some 200 other similarly situated
riparian landowners and lessees. International Paper Company (hereinafter
International) operated a pulp and paper manufacturing plant (now closed)
in the Village of Ticonderoga, New York. Appellants' complaint alleged that
International had discharged huge quantities of inadequately treated waste
into Ticonderoga Creek. Purportedly, the creek carried the waste into Lake
Champlain, where it formed a gigantic blanket of sludge on the bottom.
Appellants' contended that masses of sludge periodically broke away and
washed up onto the adjacent property, thus greatly diminishing the value
and utility of the land. The class prayed for $30,000,000 compensatory and
$10,000,000 punitive damages. Since the landowners were residents of Vermont and International was a New York corporation, the class sought
to
invoke federal jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizenship. 2
The district court determined that all of the named representatives satisfied the jurisdictional amount requirement.3 However, the court held "with
great reluctance" 4 that this alone was insufficient to confer federal jurisdiction over the class action. Rather, it was additionally necessary that each
unnamed member of the class independently satisfy the requirement of
jurisdictional amount. Upon a determination that it was "not credible that
every such owner [had] suffered pollution damage in excess of $10,000r"5
and that it could not ascertain which class members did have sufficient
claims, the district court refused to permit the suit to proceed as a class
action. The district court decision provoked vigorous dissents at two levels
of appeal, 6 but was nonetheless affirmed by the Supreme Court in a
6-3 decision."
The precise issue that the Supreme Court decided in favor of respondent was that section 1332 of Title 28 of the United States Code required
that each and every named and unnamed member of a rule 23 (b) (3)
1. -

U.S. -2, 94 S. Ct. 505 (1978).

2. Judicial Code and Judiciary Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1382 (1970) provides
in part that:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between -

3.
4.
5.
6.

(1) citizens of different States;
Zahm v. Int'l Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430, 431 (D. Vt. 1971).
Id. at 433.
Id. at 431.
Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1036 (2d Cir. 1972) (Timbers,

J., dissenting); Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., (Brennan, J., dissenting).

7.

-

U.S.

,

U.S.

-,

-,

94 S.Ct. 505, 512 (1973)

94S. Ct. 505 (1978).
(447)
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class s must meet the $10,000 requirement to sustain an allegation of diversity
jurisdiction. The Court reached this decision by relying on traditional notions
that section 1332(a) 9 requires that each litigant in a particular lawsuit have
a $10,000 claim, except in limited cases where several litigants may aggregate
claims to achieve the jurisdictional amount if the claims represent an
attempt to "... enforce a single title or right, in which they have a common
and undivided interest.
."o which is greater than $10,000.
The dissent found the logic of the majority to be uncompelling and conducive of unfortunate results." The dissenters would have applied the
concept of ancillary judisdiction to confer federal jurisdiction over the
unnamed class members.
The purpose of this casenote is to examine the application of both the
"matter in controversy" phrase and the ancillary jurisdiction concept to
class actions.
Historically, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the "matter in controversy' phrase has been unwavering. When plaintiffs with separate and
distinct demands join in a single suit based on diversity jurisdiction, each
must independently satisfy the requisite jurisdictional amount.12 The
majority in Zahn had no trouble finding numerous lower court decisions
advancing the proposition that all members of a common-question or "spurious" class must satisfy jurisdictional requirements."8 These decisions, however, were rendered under the old version of federal rule 23.14 Under the
rule as it stood prior to amendment in 1966, a common-question or "spurious" class member was bound by the judgment only if he took affirmative
action to request inclusion.15 New federal rule 23 adopts the opposite position. Under the present rule all members of such a class are bound by
the judgment, whether favorable or unfavorable, unless they take affirmative action to exclude themselves from the class."6 Realistically, the "matter
8. Frm. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3). See rule quoted in note 46 infra.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1882 (1970).
10. Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 89, 40-41 (1911).
11. - U.S. at--, 94 S. Ct. at 514 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
12. Scott v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 243 (1920); Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594
(1916); Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39 (1911); Walter v.
Northeastern R.R., 147 U.S. 870 (1898); Bernards Township v. Stebbins, 109
U.S. 341 (1883); Oliver v. Alexander, 81 U.S. (6 Pet.) 143 (1832).
13. - U.S. at , 94 S.Ct. at 510. See, e.g., Alfonso v. Hillsborough County
Aviation Authority, 808 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1962); Matlaw Corp. v. War Damage
Corp., 164 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1947); Stevenson v. Bluefield, 39 F. Supp. 462
(S.D. W. Va. 1941).
14. FrD. R. Civ. P. 28 (1938). Former rule 23 provided for three types of
class suits: "true", "hybrid", and "spurious." The distinctions were based on jural
relations; i.e., suits fit a particular class based on the character of the right to be
enforced. A "true" class suit was permitted if the right was "joint" or "common."
Where the right to be enforced was several, but the object of the suit was adjudication of claims which might affect specific property involved in the suit, the
action was called "hybrid". A "spurious" action was a suit to enforce a several
right where there existed a common question of law or fact and a common type
of relief was sought. See Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances on Lives & Granting
Annuities v. Deckert, 123 F.2d 979, 983 (3d Cir. 1941), for a further explanation of the difference between hybrid and spurious class actions.

15. FEWD.r . Civ.P. 23 (a) (1) (1938).
16.

FED. R.

Crv. P. 23 (c) (2) (B), See rule quoted note 46 infra.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss3/8

2

et al.: Recent Cases

1974]

RECENT CASES

in controversy"
should now be that amount sought on behalf of the
17
entire class.

Zahn placed extensive reliance on the rationale of the Court's postamendment decision in Snyder v. Harris.'s In Snyder the Court for the first

time 1 9 applied an interpretation of "matter in controversy" to a diversity

jurisdiction class action. In Snyder none of the members of the class, named
or unnamed, had a claim of sufficient size to satisfy the jurisdictional amount
requirement. The Court held that as to aggregation of claims for jurisdictional amount purposes, the new class action provisions were the same as
the old. Thus, the claims of individual class members could not be aggre20
gated for the purpose of exceeding the $10,000 jurisdictional requirement.
2
2
2
In both Snyder ' and Zahn the Court placed great emphasis on congressional reenactment of section 1332 without modification of the "matter
in controversy" phrase, pointing out that Congress had reenacted the statute
in the face of numerous court decisions strictly construing the phrase. The
Court in Zahn felt that congressional silence was a result of congressional
approval. The Court has not always found congressional silence so significant. In Helvering v. Hallock2 the Court stated:

It would require very persuasive circumstances enveloping
congressional silence to debar this Court from re-examining its
own doctrines. To explain the cause of non-action by Congress
when Congress
itself sheds no light is to venture into speculative
24
unrealities.

It is significant that there appears to have been no congressional consideration of the "matter in controversy" phrase when the jurisdictional minimum
17. See 394 U.S. 832, 353 (1969) (Fortas, J., dissenting); C. W1uGHT,

FEDERAL CouRTs, § 72, at 315 (2d ed. 1970); Bangs, Revised Rule 23: Aggregation of Claims for Achievement of JurisdictionalAmount, 10 B.C. IND. & Com.
L. IEv. 601, 613-14 (1969).

18. 394 U.S. 832 (1969). The decision was occasioned by a division in the

courts of appeals. Gas Serv. Co. v. Coburn, 889 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1968) held
that aggregation of small claims was permissible for the purpose of exceeding the
$10,000 requirement. Snyder v. Harris, 390 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1968) took the
opposite position.
19. The majority in both Snyder and Zahn cite Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 806
U.S. 583 (1939), for the proposition that the Court long ago applied the "matter
in controversy" interpretation to class actions. Snyder explicitly refers to Clark

as a class action. 394 U.S. at 336-37. Such analysis appears to be incorrect. In

reality, Clark was nothing more than a permissive joinder case. See Zahn v.
Int'l Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1039 (2d Cir. 1972) (Timbers, J., dissenting);
Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 58 F.R.D. 430, 431 (D. Vt. 1971). Clark is further
distinguishable from Zahn on the basis that only one plaintiff met the jurisdic-

tional amount requirement. All of the named plaintiffs in Zqhn had claims of
sufficient size.
20. 394 U.S. at 336. The Snyder decision has been the subject of much
criticism. See, e.g., C. Wmrrr, supra note 17 at 315-16; The Supreme Court,
1968 Term, 83 HAuv. L. REv. 7, 202-12 (1969); 21 SYRAcusE L. lEv. 326
(1969); 37 TENN. L. lEv. 103 (1969); 24 U. Mwum. L. REv. 173 (1969). But
see 22 U. FLA. L. PEv. 154 (1969).
21. 894 U.S. at 839.
22. - U.S. at -, 94 S. Ct. at 512.
23. 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
24. Id. at 119-20. For language of similar import, see James v. United
States, 366 U.S. 213, 220 (1961); Commr v. Glenshaw Class Co., 348 U.S. 426,
431 (1955); Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1946).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
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was raised in 1958.25 Indeed, the only recent suggestion of congressional
purpose with respect to the jurisdictional amount is found in the legislative

history of the 1958 amendment:
The recommendations of the Judicial Conference [of the
United States] regarding the amount in controversy, which this
committee approves, is based on the premise that the amount
should be fixed at a sum of money that will make jurisdiction available in all substantialcontroversies
where other elements of federal
26

jurisdiction are present.
The difficulty in reconciling this statement with the result in Zahn is
apparent. The class in Zahn prayed for monetary relief in the amount of
$40,000,000. It can hardly be claimed that Zahn did not involve a "sub-

stantial" controversy.
Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent, demurred to the majority

position on the ground that ancillary jurisdiction should have been utilized
to confer adjudicatory power in the federal courts.2 T Under the ancillary
jurisdiction concept, a district court, as an incident to disposition of any
matter properly before it, possesses the power to decide other facets of the
case of which it could not take cognizance were they independently presented.2 8 For example, the Supreme Court has held ancillary jurisdiction

applicable to the assertion of a compulsory counterclaim29 and to a party
intervening of right. 30 Following this lead, the lower courts have employed

the concept to obtain jurisdiction over impleaded third party defendants, 31
cross-claims, 32 and interpleader actions. 33 Prior to Zahn, it appeared that

ancillary jurisdiction was an expanding concept 3 4

25. See Hearing on H.R. 2516 and H.R. 4497 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 5 (1957); H.R. REP.
No. 1706, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.

(1958).

26. S. REP. No. 1830, supra note 25 (emphasis added).
27. - U.S. at -, 94 S. Ct. at 514 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
28. See generally Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdictionand the Joinder of Claims in
the FederalCourts, 33 F.R.D. 27 (1963); H. HART & H. Wi.cHsLER, THlE FEDERAL
CounTs AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM, 1074-81 (2d ed. 1973); C. WRaT, supra
note 12, at 39.
29. Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 848 (1961); Moore v. New
York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
30. Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236 (1886).
81. See, e.g., Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d
709 (5th Cir. 1970); Sheppard v. Atlantic States Gas Co., 167 F.2d 841 (3d Cir.
1948). See also 6 C. WRIGr & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRocEDURE
§ 1444 (1971).
32. See, e.g., LASA Per L'Industria Del Marmo Societa Per Azioni v. Alexander, 414 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1969); R.M. Smythe & Co. v. Chase Nat'l Bank,
291 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1961); Childress v. Cook, 245 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1957);
Coastal Air Lines, Inc. v. Dockery, 180 F.2d 874 (8th Cir. 1950); Barker v.
Louisiana &Arkansas R.R., 57 F.R.D. 489 (D. La. 1972). See also 6 C. WImHT &
A. MILLER, supra note 31, at § 1433.
83. See, e.g., Walmac Co. v. Isaacs, 220 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1955). See also

7 C.W Grrr &A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE §

1710 (1972).

34. For an enthusiastic endorsement of pendent jurisdiction, a particularized
application of the ancillary jurisdiction concept, see United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 724-25 (1966). See also Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033,
1039 (2d Cir. 1972) (Timbers, J., dissenting); 11 OxLA. L. REv. 326, 329 (1958).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss3/8
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Justice Brennan cited Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble3 5 in support
of his position. In Ben-Hur the Court held that only the original named
plaintiffs and defendants needed to satisfy the diversity requirement, 36 and
that even intervention by nondiverse members of the class would not defeat
diversity.37 Thus, in Ben-Hur the jurisdictional determination was made
solely on the basis of the named representatives of the class. Without reference to Ben-Hur, the majority in Zahn required that each class member
independently satisfy jurisdictional prerequisites.
It is possible to distinguish Zahn from Ben-Hur on the theory that
Ben-Hur involved a "true" class action enforcing a "joint" or "common"
right of the entire class for injunctive relief,38 while Zahn involved a "spurious" class action where the plaintiffs sought to enforce the "separate and
distinct" rights of individuals for their separate money damages. Rule 23 (b)
(2) injunctive relief class actions are given favorable treatment for purposes
of prerequisites for maintenance 9 and jurisdictional amount. For instance,
to satisfy the "matter in controversy" requirement a (b) (2) class need only
show that the value of the right to be protected exceeds $10,000.40
It is arguable that such distinctions do not mean that (b) (2) and
(b) (3) class actions should be treated differently for purposes of ancillary
jurisdiction. Rule 23 (b) (3) common-question class actions are similar to
suits to enforce a right of the entire class since only those opting out of the
class are not bound by the judgment. Besides, the most important goal of
ancillary jurisdiction is to maximize judicial economy by avoiding piecemeal
litigation.41 This goal is hardly advanced by holding the concept applicable

85. 255 U.S. 356 (1921).

86. Id. at 866.
37. Id. at 366.
38. Ben-Hur was an action for injunctive relief and would have fallen in the
category of a "true" class action under the 1938 version of Federal Rule 23. The
comparable provision under the present rule is FED. R. Crv. P. 23 (b) (2) (1970).
See rule quoted in note 46 infra.
Another possible distinction between the cases is that Ben-Hur dealt with
the determination of diversity of citizenship while Zahn concerned the amount in
controversy requirement. However, the Court in Ben-Hur based its decision on
the practical impossibility of examining the citizenship of each and every class
member to insure complete diversity, 255 U.S. at 366-67. The logic of Ben-Hur
seems equally applicable to the jurisdictional amount requirement. The reasoning
of Ben-Hur should not be rejected simply because the case involved diversity and
not jurisdictional amount. It is significant that the majority in Zahn made no
attempt to distinguish Ben-Hur on any basis.
39. See rule quoted in note 46 infra. Compare the requirements for the
maintenance of a FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (2) action with those of a FE. R.
Civ. P. 23 (b) (3) common-question action.
40. See Comprehensive Group Health Serv. Bd. of Directors v. Temple
Univ., 363 F. Supp. 1069, 1094 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Bass v. Rockefeller, 831 F. Supp.
945, 952 (S.D. N.Y. 1971), vacated as moot, 464 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1971);
Marquez v. Hardin, 339 F. Supp. 1364, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1969); Biechele v.
Norfolk &Western Ry., 309 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
41. See Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdictionand the Joinder of Claims in the Federal Courts, 83 F.R.D. 27 (1963); Jacobson v. Atlantic City Hosp., 892 F.2d 149,
153-54 (3d Cir. 1968); Dunbar & Sullivan Dredging Co. v. J. R. Jurgensen Co.,
44 F.R.D. 467, 473 (S.D. Ohio 1967), aff'd, 396 F.2d 152 (6th Cir. 1968); Lucas
v. Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp. 338,848 (D. Minn. 1967).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
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to class actions seeking one particular remedy while denying it to class
actions praying for other types of relief. Indeed, the Court itself has rejected
this distinction. In Snyder both the majority42 and dissent43 speak of Ben-Hur
as controlling in class actions without regard to the type of relief sought.
Likewise, the lower courts have regarded Ben-Hur as applicable to class
actions seeldng damages, 44 as well as to those praying for injunctive relief.45
The majority in Zahn ignored the ancillary jurisdiction question and
Ben-Hur entirely.
Assuming that Zahn and Ben-Hur are in fact distinguishable and that
Zahn was correctly decided, what will be the next step? Does Zahn portend
a holding that complete diversity of citizenship is required in a (b) (3)
common-question class action? Although such a decision would be unfortunate, after Zahn it appears possible.
To the extent Zahn and Ben-Hur represent differing philosophies concerning jurisdictional requirements of federal class actions, the Ben-Hur
approach is more practical. This is especially true under new federal rule
23.16 The prerequisites for maintaining a (b) (3) class action, especially
42. 394 U.S. at 340.

43. 394 U.S. at 355.
44. See Hobbs v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 76 (E.D. Pa. 1970);

Neville v. Delta Ins. Co., 45 F.R.D. 345 (D. Minn. 1968).

45. Day-Brite Lighting Div. v. Int'l Brd. of Elec. Workers, 303 F. Supp.
1086 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Collins v. Bolton, 287 F. Supp. 393 (N.D. III. 1968).
46. FED, R. Civ. P. 23 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may

sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of
lav or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivisions (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members
of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for
the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not
parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to
protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief
or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings
include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy
already commenced by or against members of the class;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of
the claims in the particular forum;

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss3/8

6

1974]

et al.: Recent Cases
RECENT CASES

the provision that "[t]he questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class [must] predominate over questions affecting only individual
members", 47 amply guarantee that ancillary jurisdiction would not be abused.
Under the elaborate guidelines and discretion built into new rule 23, the district court should have the power to exercise ancillary jurisdiction over the
unnamed class members.
Although there are important exceptions, 48 after Zahn it appears that
class actions for damages in the federal courts will be limited to the "extraordinary situations"49 in which each member of the class has a claim exceeding $10,000.80 As a result, the alternatives open to prospective plaintiffs are
limited. The only available options are individual litigation or state court
class actions.
The disappearance of the federal forum resulting from Zahn will
undoubtedly lead to an increased number of class actions being filed in the
state courts. Unfortunately, many states retain very restrictive attitudes
with respect to class actions. 51 The situation in New York, where International's plant was located, has recently been described as "darkness largely
(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained; Notice;
Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought
as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered
or amended before the decision on the merits.
(2) In anuy class action maintained under subdivision (b) (8), the court
shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court
will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the
judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who did not request
exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires,
enter an appearance through his counsel.
47. Fm. R. Crv. P. 8 (b) (8).
48. The most notable being § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
Another important exception is the abridgement of civil rights, Judicial Code and
Judiciary Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1848 (1970). See also Securities Act of 1988, §§ 11,
12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1970); Securities Act of 1988, § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 77a
(1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 9 (e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i (e) (1970);
Securities Act of 1984, § 10 (b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970) in conjunction with
SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978); Securities Exchange Act of 1984,
§ 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970). Jurisdiction over securities cases arising under these
provisions is governed by the Securities Act of 1988, § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970),
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1984, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970); neither
mentioning a jurisdictional minimum.
49. C. WniGHr, supranote 7, § 72, at 816.
50. Cf. Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n, 414 F.2d 811 (1st Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 896 U.S. 1087 (1970), where a class action on behalf of race horse
owners was held to be maintainable under FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (1) (B), since
their interest in having the defendants create a fund for their benefit was thought
to be "common and undivided", although no class member had a claim exceeding

$10,000.

51. See Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1088, 1040 (2d Cir. 1972)
(Timbers, J., dissenting); Travers & Landers, The Consumer Class Action, 18
KAN.L. REv. 811, 819 (1970).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
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unobscured".5 2 At least one commentator has concluded that New 53
York
does not even allow class actions seeking damages to be maintained.
The situation in Missouri appears to be somewhat brighter. Since
Missouri has adopted the new federal class action rule, a class action such
as that in Zahn is possible. Even under Missouri's new rule, however, the
problems awaiting a class action may be formidable. 4
The alternative to a state court class action is individual litigation in
state or federal court. For many plaintiffs this is no alternative at all. In
Zahn the expense of expert scientific testimony alone would probably
prove prohibitive to the individual claimant.r5 In a jurisdiction retaining
a restrictive attitude toward class actions, the net result will be a valid
claim with costs exceeding its value. Such a result "will do no judicial
system credit."5 6
Absent congressional action in redefining the "matter in controversy'
phrase, the role of the federal courts in future class action litigation will
be narrowt'T It is therefore urged that states adopt a class action rule similar
to present federal rule 23.5s It is hoped that state courts will give such a
rule a practical reading. After Zahn, federal rule 23 is living proof that a
liberal rule enveloped in restrictive doctrine is of little value. One cannot
help but believe that the designers of federal rule 23 intended it to be
something more than a mere model for the states.
1icHARD L. Am~rs

52. McLaughlin, Supplementary Practice Commentary, N.Y. Civ. Pnoc.
§ 1005 (McKinney Supp. 1973).

LAW

58. Travers & Landers, supra note 51, at 818-19. See Hall v. Coburn Corp..

26 N.Y.2d 896, 259 N.E.2d 720, 811 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1970). Since Vermont did not

adopt the federal class action rule until July, 1971, it would appear that the
federal court was the only forum available to the class in Zahn.
54. For an in depth look at Missouri's new rule, see Fisch, Notice, Costs,
and the Effect of Judgment in Missouri's New Common-Question Class Action,
88 Mo. L. REv. 173 (1978).
55. - U.S. at -, 94 S.Ct. at 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
56. - U.S. at -, 94 S. Ct. at 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
57. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.

58. Thus far the following jurisdictions have adopted what is substantially
the 1966 version of FED. R.Civ. P. 28: Arizona, R.Civ. P. 23; Colorado R. Civ.
P. 28; District of Columbia, R.Civ. P. 23; Indiana, R. or TIuAL PRoC. 23; Kansas,
R. Crv. P. § 60-228 (Supp. 1978); Kentucky, R. Civ. P. 23; Minnesota, R. Civ.
P. 28; Missouri, Mo. R. Civ. P. 52.08; Montana, R. Civ. P. 28; New Jersey, Civ.

PrAc. R. 4:82; North Dakota, R. Civ. P. 28; Ohio, R.Cirv. P. 23; South Dakota,

DAxOTA CoMp. LAws 15-6-23 (Supp. 1973); Tennessee R. Civ. P. 23
(Supp. 1978); Utah, R. Civ. P. 28 (Supp. 1978); Vermont, R.Civ. P. 28; Wash-

SouTH

ington, RuLEs OF

PLEADING,

PnACTicE AND PocEDru

23; Wyoming, R. Civ.

P. 28. Effective July, 1974, Massachusetts adopted a modified version of the

federal rule. The Massachusetts rule was influenced by Homburger, State Class
Actions and the FederalRule, 71 CoLur.
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ESTATE TAX-TRANSFERS IN CONTEMPLATION
OF DEATH-FLIGHT INSURANCE

Berman v. United States'
Joseph Berman, a 67 year old lawyer in good health, purchased a flight
insurance policy before boarding a commercial airliner. Berman assigned
ownership of the policy to his son, who was also the beneficiary. Berman
died when his flight crashed. Decedent's estate paid the tax on the proceeds
and sued for a refund. The district court found that the assignment was not
a transfer in contemplation of death under section 2035 of the Internal
Revenue Code and that the proceeds were thus not includable in the estate
for tax purposes. 2 The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the
lower court had confused expectation of death with contemplation of death3
The Supreme Court has held that flight insurance is life insurance for
estate tax purposes.4 Section 2042 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
provides that proceeds from insurance on the decedents life are taxable to
the gross estate if payable to the estate. In addition, where the decedent
possessed any incidents of ownership in such policies at his death, proceeds payable to a named beneficiary are also includable in the decedent's
estate.5 Section 2035(a) requires that the value of property transferred in

1. 487 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1973).
2. Berman v. United States, 367 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. Miss. 1973). The court
relied on the following findings in its decision: (1) The decedent was in excellent
health with no pressing problems at the time of the assignment; (2) The policy
purchased was the smallest policy issued to the public; (3) The existence of the

policy and its assignment had no causal connection with the decedent's death;
(4) The policy was only a small part of decedent's estate; (5) Decedent had
made the same flight in the past; (6) Decedent had planned certain activities
(conducting religious services among other things) in succeeding months.
3. Berman v. United States, 487 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1973). "But the ques-

tion is not whether he expected to die, but whether the assignment of the policy

was motivated by the thought that he might die." Id. at 72.
4. Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 880 U.S. 678 (1965). In response to
the contention that flight insurance was not life insurance, the Court said that,
since Ackerman v. Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 635 (1929), "it has been the settled
and consistent administrative practice to include insurance proceeds for accidental
death under policies like these in the estates of decedents." Id. at 681. The Court

stated that flight insurance was insurance taken out on the life of the decedent
and found the donor's attempted assignment to his wife ineffective for estate tax

purposes. Id. at 682-83.
5. Section 2042 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property(1) Receivable by the executor.-To the extent of the amount receivable by the executor as insurance under policies on the life of the
decedent.
(2) Receivable by other beneficiaries-To the extent of the amount
receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies on the

life of the decedent with respect to which the decedent possessed at
his death any of the incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone
or in conjunction with any other person. For purposes of the preceding

sentence, the term "incident of ownership" includes a reversionary interest (whether arising by the express terms of the policy or other instruPublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
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contemplation of death be included in the donor's gross estate for estate
tax purposes." Includability under section 2035 is not affected by the fact
that the decedent absolutely parted with his enjoyment of and title to the
property. 7 Thus, the value of a flight insurance policy may be taxed under
section 20428 or section 2035,1 depending on whether the policy owner
transferred the incidents of ownership.
United States v. Wells,' 0 the leading case on transfers in contemplation
of death, stated that the purpose of the contemplation of death provision
was to prevent evasion of the federal estate tax by taxing transfers which
were substitutes for testamentary dispositions. A transfer is in contemplation
of death if it is prompted by the thought of death." Treasury Regulation
20.2035-1 states that a transfer is prompted by the thought of death if:
(1) made with the purpose of avoiding death taxes, (2) made as a substitute for a testamentary disposition of the property, or (3) made for any
other motive associated with death. 12 Wells required that the thought of3
death be "controlling" and the "dominant" motive prompting the transfer.
Section 2035(b) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that transfers
made within three years of the donor's death are deemed to be in contemplation of death unless shown to the contrary.' 4 The language of section
ment or by operation of law) only if the value of such reversionary
interest exceeded 5 percent of the value of the policy immediately
before the death of the decedent. As used in this paragraph, the term
"reversionary interest" includes a possibility that the policy, or the
proceeds of the policy, may return to the decedent or his estate, or may
be subject to a power of disposition by him ....
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2042.
6. Section 2035(a) provides:
(a) General RulC.-The value of the gross estate shall include the
value of all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the
decedent has at any time made a transfer (except in case of a bona
fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money s
worth), by trust or otherwise, in contemplation of his death.
nt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2035(a).
7. Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1(a) (1958). Most of the transfers which are
included in the gross estate under §§ 2034-44 of the Internal Revenue Code are
taxed on the theory that the donor did not completely transfer the property during
his life. See C. LowNDEs & R. KRAummi, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES 32
(2d ed. 1962).
8. Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678 (1965). See also 1 A.
CASNERn, ESTATE PLANNING 325 n. 76 (Supp. 1978).

9. Berman v. United States, 487 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1973). Since the
decedent's assignment of the policy transferred all incidents of ownership, the
proceeds were no longer includable under § 2042, but were includable under
§ 2035 as a transfer in contemplation of death. The Supreme Court, in dictum,
has recognized that flight insurance may be effectively assigned for the purposes
of § 2042. Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678, 684 (1965).
10. 283 U.S. 102, 116-17 (1931).
11. Id. at 118.
12. Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1 (c) (1958).
18. 283 U.S. at 118-19. Wells also stated that, although the statute referred
to contemplation of death rather than contemplation of imminent death, the
general expectation of death which all people entertain is not sufficient. "It must
be a particular concern, giving rise to a definite motive." Id. at 115.
14. Section 2085(b) of the Internal Revenue Code provides:
(b) Application of General Rule-If the decedent within a period
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss3/8
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2035(b) indicates that this presumption is rebuttable. A conclusive presump-

tion might be unconstitutional. In Heiner v. Donnan,9 a federal tax statute

creating a conclusive presumption that all transfers within two years of the
donor's death were made in contemplation of death was held to be so
arbitrary and unreasonable that it violated Fifth Amendment due process.' 6
Despite Heiner v. Donnan, however, the Internal Revenue Service takes a
position regarding flight insurance that, where an air travel policy is assigned to a relative, the transfer is conclusively presumed to be in contemplation of death.1 7 The rationale is that, since the policy only has value in
the event of a disaster which would likely result in death, it is inconceivable
that a life motive could exist for its transfer.' 8 The court in Berman did not
adopt that position, however, reversing instead on the ground that there was
insufficient evidence to support a finding that Berman did not make the
transfer in contemplation of death. 19 The court held that to overcome the
section 2035(b) presumption, the estate must show that the decedent had
specific life motives in transferring the property, not simply that the donor
20
expected to live.
Whether a particular transfer was in contemplation of death depends
on the intent of the donor and is determined by the factual pattern surrounding the transfer. 21 Because life insurance has little value during life
but substantial value on death, its main economic significance is related to
the death of the insured. Courts, nevertheless, recognize that the transfer of
life insurance is not inherently testamentary. 22 A variety of factors are considered in determining whether a transfer was made in contemplation of
of 3 years ending with the date of his death (except in case of a bona
fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money s
worth) transferred an interest in property, relinquished a power, or
exercised or released a general power of appointment, such transfer,
relinquishment, exercise, or release shall, unless shown to the contrary,
be deemed to have been made in contemplation of death within the
meaning of this section and sections 2038 and 2041 (relating to revocable
transfers and powers of appointment); but no such transfer, relinquishment, exercise, or release made before such 3-year period shall be treated
as having been made in contemplation of death.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2035(b).
15. 285 U.S. 312 (1932).
16. Id. at 325.
17. A.B.A. Section of Taxation Bull., Jan. 1962 at 69.
18. Berman v. United States, 487 F.2d 70, 78 (5th Cir. 1973). See also
Kahn v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 806, 811 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
19. 487 F.2d 70, 73 (5th Cir. 1973).
20. Id. at 72. Discussing the estate's burden under § 2035 (b), the Berman
court said that "this is seldom a light burden, and where the property transferred
is so inherently death-oriented as le insurance, it is even heavier." Id. at 72.
21. United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. at 119; C. LowNDs & R.

KnAMMR,

supra

note 7 at 74. The court will ascertain the decedent's motivation by balancing
the reduction in estate tax against the plausibility of the lifetime motive. Quiggle,
Recent Developments In Contemplationof Death, N.Y.U. 25th Inst. on Fed. Tax.
1047, 1063 (1967).
22. Bintliff v. United States, 462 F.2d 403, 406 (5th Cir. 1972); Hulls
Estate v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 367, 368 (3rd Cir. 1963); Kahn v. United
States, 349 F. Supp. 806, 811 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Landori v. United States, 408
F.2d 461, 472 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
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death. Among the most important of these are: (1) the age and physical
condition of the donor at the date of transfer; (2) the interval between the
transfer and donor's death; (3) the nature of the property transferred; (4)
the amount of property transferred in proportion to the amount retained by
the donor; and (5) the motive of the transferor23 Courts have excluded
the proceeds of life insurance from the gross estate where the estate proved
that the transfer was made to secure the financial position or emotional

state of the donee,24 to put the policies beyond the reach of creditors, 25 or
to continue an established pattern of gift giving.2 6 As Berman illustrates,
however, the special nature of flight insurance makes the section 2035(b)
presumption difficult to rebut.
Because flight insurance policies have no cash surrender or loan value,
the estate's argument in a flight insurance case, that there was a life motive
behind the policy assignment of giving the donee a valuable present propetry interest; is weaker than in life insurance cases. 27 In Berman, the estate
argued that the purpose of the assignment was to give the decedents son
28
full control of disability benefits provided in the flight insurance policy.
Since the disability benefits would be paid only if the insured survived, the
transfer of these benefits could not have been in the contemplation of death.
The court held, however, that there was no evidence that the decedent
differentiated between possible death benefits and possible disability benefits, and thus the estate's contention that the transfer was motivated by a
sense of moral obligation to the son's business venture was insufficient to
23. LowNDEs & Knxtzn, supra note 7, at 71. See also, Estate of Oliver
Johnson, 10 T.C. 680 (1948), which mentions other factors such as the relationship of the donee to the decedent, the nature and disposition of the decedent,
and the existence of a long established gift making policy by the decedent. Id.
at 688.
24. Hull's Estate v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 367 (3rd Cir. 1963); Cronin's
Estate v. Commissioner, 164 F.2d 561 (6th Cir. 1947). See also, Estate of Louis
Baskind, 10 P-H B.T.A. Mem. 546 (1941). In Baskind, the court held that the
decedent's willingness to surrender the insurance policies for cash (an amount
less than the death benefits) was persuasive that the transfer was motivated by
purposes associated with life.
25. Estate of Verne C. Hunt, 14 T.C. 1182 (1950).
26. Landorf v. United States, 408 F.2d 461 (Ct. C1. 1969). Other motives
which have been suggested as indicia of thoughts of life are business motives,
saving income or property taxes, solving family problems, fulfilling a moral
obligation, and relief from the burdens of managing the policies. See Quiggle,
supra note 20, at 1052-56. United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102, 119 (1931),
stated that the desire "to recognize special needs or exigencies or to discharge
moral obligations" for one's children is recognized as a motive inconsistent with
the contemplation of death.
27. This argument, as applied to life insurance, was successful in Hulls
Estate v. Commissioner, 825 F.2d 367 (3rd Cir. 1963), where the court found
that the purpose of the transfers was to improve the mental and emotional state
of the decedents daughter (who had just been divorced). The decedent transferred a total of fifteen policies to his three daughters in order to treat them
equally. The court held that the transfers were not made in contemplation of
death, even though the decedent continued to pay the premiums after the
transfers.Id. at 369-70. The transfer of flight insurance does not create such a
present property interest.
28. Berman v. United States, 487 F.2d 70, 73 (5th Cir. 1973).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss3/8
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show a dominant life motive.29 Although the estate's argument in Berman
failed, the possibility that flight insurance policy benefits may be paid during
the life of the insured could, under some circumstances, be a factor in
rebutting the section 2035(b) presumption."
An estate's best chance of rebutting the presumption in the case of a
decedent's assignment of flight insurance is to prove an established pattern
or plan of gift giving.31 In Landorf v. United States,32 the decedent transferred a group life insurance policy to his wife, who was also the beneficiary,
within three years of his death. The transferred policy was similar to a flight
insurance policy in that it had no cash surrender or loan value. The Court
of Claims excluded the proceeds from the gross estate, concluding that the
estate established a pattern of gift giving by showing that the decedent had
made gifts and assigned other life insurance policies to his wife and children
in the past.33 The estate in Berman had no similar pattern of gift giving to
assist it in meeting its burden of persuasion. Evidence of such a plan might
dictate a different result.
The case of Kahn v. United States34 illustrates that a decedent can
transfer an accidental death insurance policy with life motives. In Kahn,
a young husband and his wife applied for group accidental death insurance
having no cash surrender or loan value, which was paid for by the husband's
employer. The insurance agent, a family friend, suggested that each spouse
place ownership of the policy in the other, and they did so without question.
Both were killed in a hotel fire soon after. The government, contending
that the transfers were in contemplation of death, included the insurance
policy proceeds in the estate of the insured. The estates sued for refunds.
The court noted that: (1) the decedents were in good health; (2) the insurance policy was a result of the employer's initiative; (3) neither of the
decedents had engaged in any significant estate planning and that the
agent's motives could not be imputed to them; and (4) the policy also
covered dismemberment and disability, and therefore could result in payments during the life of the insured. 35 This circumstantial evidence led the
court to conclude that the policies were transferred simply because the
decedents trusted and relied upon the agent's advice.36 The court found
that neither the thought of death nor the avoidance of estate taxes were the

29. Id. at 78.
30. See, e.g., Kahn v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 806 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
31. A transfer is not considered in contemplation of death if the decedent's
motive for the transfer was to fulfill a plan to distribute his property during his
lifetime. Bel v. United States, 452 F.2d 683, 688 (5th Cir. 1971).
32. 408 F.2d 461 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
33. Id. at 473. The court recognized that the transfer of the life insurance
policy involved some death-connected motivation, because insurance proceeds
are payable only upon the insured's death. In the case of policies without cash
surrender or loan values, it admitted that the estates burden of showing dominant
life motives was even more difficult. The court concluded, however, that this
presumption was rebutted by showing a history of gift giving.
84. 349 F. Supp. 806 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
35. Id. at 811.
36. Id. at 812.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
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dominant, controlling, or impelling motives behind the transfer and held
that the estate had proven life motives. 37 The Kahn court questioned the
government's position that people transfer property only as a result of concrete motivation which is dominated by thoughts of either life or death.38
The court's approach suggests counterargurnents to the government's contention that a transfer of flight insurance must be in contemplation of death.
Landoil and Kahn may be favorable precedents for a taxpayer trying
to exclude flight insurance proceeds from the gross estate. The problem is
showing that flight insurance should be treated like other accidental death
or group life insurance (policies having no cash surrender or loan value), a9
Even if Landorf and Kahn are applicable to flight insurance, the estate will
nevertheless have a heavy burden of persuasion to prove that a life motive
was dominant in the assignment of a flight insurance policy. The taxpayer's
position is strengthened, however, by the holding in Heiner v. Donnan that
a conclusive presumption that a transfer is in contemplation of death violates the Fifth Amendment. A history of transfers of ownership of other
policies and property by the decedent would create a strong taxpayer case
for the jury to consider. Under Commissionerv. Duberstein,40 where the jury
has tried the issues upon correct instructions, appellate review is restricted
to inquiring whether reasonable men could not reach the jury's determination of the transferor's intent. Thus, if an estate could show that the
decedent's transfer of a flight insurance policy was motivated by the desire
to carry out a previously established estate plan, it would 4 appear to have
some chance of rebutting the heavy presumption against it. '
CONCLUSION
The assignment of flight insurance creates a strong presumption that
the transfer was in contemplation of death. Although Berman does not adopt
87. "Since there were no death motives involved in the transfers, it follows
that the real motives for the transfers [decedents' trust in the insurance agent
and perfunctory acceptance of his advice] were life motives." Id. at 812.
38. Kahn v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 806, 812 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
39. See Berall, Use of Life Insurance in Estate Planning-Recent Developments, N.Y.U. 31st Inst. on Fed. Tax. 1053, 1103 (1978):
In light of the Kahn holding that life motives could exist for the purchase or transfer of an accidental death or dismemberment policy, even
airport accidental death insurance (which ordinarily includes dismemberment coverage) might be excludable from the insured's gross estate,
where life motives could be proven.
40. 863 U.S. 278, 290-91 (1960). "Vhere the trial has been by a judge
without a jury, the judge's findings must stand unless clearly erroneous." Id.
at 291.
41. See Berall, supra note 34, at 1091:
[S]ince the amount of premium is relatively small, if the beneficiary
could be the applicant, use his own funds (not any received indirectly
from the insured in the form of a gift or a household allowance), and
have proof that his funds were used to pay the premium, the policy
should be excludable from the insured's estate.
The difficulties of having the beneficiary as the applicant and proving that he paid for the policy with his own funds makes the airport purchase method of obtaining insurance against accidental death not very
practical, at least until the vendors of such insurance change their sales
prncedures.
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the government position that this is an irrebuttable presumption, it does
indicate that the estate will have to show specific life motives, such as the
fulfillment of an estate plan, to prevail. Under Heiner v. Donnan, there is
some question whether any decision adopting the extreme government position would stand if appealed to the Supreme Court. The fact that the policy
includes disability benefits payable during the insured's life may not be
sufficient, by itself, to rebut the presumption.
PmTm BRowEm

EVIDENCE-THE UNAVAILABILITY REQUIREMENT FOR
DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTERESTSHOULD IT BE RETAINED?
Orr. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.'
The plaintiffs, Homer Orr and his daughter Sharon, were injured and
Homer's wife was killed in an automobile collision with Charles Young. The
question arose whether the insurance policy of Charles' father covered the
automobile Charles was driving, which belonged to Charles' grandmother.
The policy issued to Charles' father covered non-owned automobiles, but
excepted non-owned automobiles "furnished or available for the frequent
or regular use of the named insured, his spouse, or any relation of either
residing in the same household....,,
On February 4, 1969, an adjuster for State Farm obtained from Charles
a statement that his grandmother's car was available for his frequent use at
all times. This statement was recorded on a dictaphone, transcribed, and
shown to Charles. Shortly thereafter, State Farm notified Charles of its
intention to disclaim any obligation under the insurance policy of Charles'
father. Plaintiffs filed suit on December 19, 1969, and agreed with Charles
to levy execution only against State Farm. On January 10, 1970, State Farm's
attorneys questioned Charles concerning use of his grandmother's car and
its availability to him. This conversation was recorded by a court reporter
and transcribed. Charles stated that for nearly a year prior to the accident
he had used the car from two to four times each week.
A few days before trial, State Farm took Charles' deposition, apparently
expecting him to reaffirm his previous statements. Charles stated, however,
that he could not remember how often he used the car and that he did not
remember the questions and answers from his prior statement 3
The trial court admitted the prior statements of Charles as declarations
against interest.4 On appeal, in support of the trial court's action, State Farm
suggested that the Missouri Supreme Court should abandon the unavailability requirement for declaration against interest. The court noted that there

1. 494 S.W.2d 295 (Mo. En Banc 1973).
2. Id. at 296.
8. Id. at 297-98.
4. Id.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974

15

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [1974], Art. 8
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

was considerable support for eliminating the unavailability requirement5
and exhibited a strong inclination towards following that trend." The court
was able to side step a definitive ruling on the issue, however, by ruling
that Charles was "unavailable" due to his loss of memory.7 The purpose of
this note is to consider the wisdom of eliminating the unavailability requirement and to suggest alternative courses of action.8
In order to appreciate the unavailability requirement for declarations
against interest, it is necessary to understand the rationale for the American
rules of hearsay evidence. Hearsay is any out-of-court statement offered to
prove the truth of its contents. 9 The factors upon which the credibility of
any out-of-court statement depend are perception (Did the declarant accurately observe the event?), memory (Did the declarant remember what
he observed?), narration (What did the declarant mean by the words he
used?), and sincerity (Is the declarant telling the truth?). 10 Hearsay is
generally inadmissible because the circumstances under which the statement
is made do not adequately insure that these factors are present.
Exceptions to the hearsay rule developed because certain excepted outof-court statements were believed to possess significant additional indicia of
trustworthiness over normal hearsay and/or because the evidence represented by the excepted statement was otherwise not available. 1 If there is
sufficient trustworthiness, the amount of other evidence available is unimportant. Where, however, an exception is framed which does not adequately
guarantee its own reliability,
then the exception will apply only when the
12
declarant is unavailable.

5. Id. at 298. Dean McCormick's treatise on evidence suggests:
The reasoning which admits the admissions of a party and spontaneous
declarations... without regard to the unavailability of the party or the
declarant - namely that the admission, or the spontaneous declaration,
is just as credible as his present testimony would be - seems equally
applicable to the declaration against interest.
C. McConwscK, EVIDENCE § 280, at 678 (2d ed. 1972). McCormick's position
is seconded by Professor Jones: "The requirement is not imposed with respect to
admissions of parties or 'res gestae' statements, and the declaration against interest
would seem to carry adequate qualities of trustworthiness, whether the declarant
is or is not present.' 2 B. JoNEs, EVMENCE § 295, at 561 (5th ed. 1958). MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 509 (1) (1942) and UNIFORm RULEs OF EVIDENCE
63(10) reject the unavailability requirement. Justice Traynor abolished the
unavailability requirement for declarations against interest in California in People
v. Sprig~s, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 876, 389 P.2d 877, 882, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841, 846 (1964).
Traynor s new rule was quickly modified by the legislature, however. See note
22 infra.
6. 494 S.W.2d at 298.
7. Id. at 299.
8. Orr dealt with two other questions: (1) Whether loss of memory is
unavailability, and (2) whether a party's taking a deposition renders the witness
available to him. These aspects of the case are beyond the scope of this note.
9. Cottonseed Delinting Corp. v. Roberts Bros. Inc., 218 S.W.2d 592, 594
(1949); C. McCortNacx, supra note 5, § 246, at 584; UNIFoRM RuLEs OF EviDENCE 63.
10. C. McCoRnmCic, supranote 5, § 245, at 581.
11. 5 J. WiGMonE, EVDENCE § 1420, at 202 (3rd ed. 1940).

12. C. McCormifcx, supra note 5, § 253, at 608.
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Hearsay exceptions requiring unavailability are based on the premise
that, although it is better to have the declarant on the stand where the
reliability of his testimony can be cross-examined, admitting evidence having
questionable reliability is preferable to admitting no evidence at all. Hearsay
statements are admitted under these exceptions because the declarant's
in-court testimony cannot be obtained because of his unavailability, and the
out-of-court statements have some degree of reliability. A declaration against
interest does not have a high degree of trustworthiness because there are no
safeguards with respect to perception, memory, and narration.'3 The declaration against interest exception should therefore apply only when the
declarant is unavailable.
Several practical problems would be created if the requirement of unavailability were eliminated. For instance, where the declarant had previously made a declaration against interest favorable to an attorney's case, the
attorney may be reluctant to call the declarant as a witness, thus avoiding
the possibility of the declarant changing his testimony on the stand. This
would permit the attorney to use evidence of lesser reliability at his discretion, thereby depriving the jury of the better evidence.
Another consequence of eliminating the unavailability requirement is
that it relieves the proponent of the declaration from the burden of producing the declarant in court. 14 The other party will have this burden once
the declaration has been proved, if he wishes to test the statement's
reliability. 15 In addition, the rule against impeaching one's own witness may
foreclose impeachment of the declarant by the party against whom the decIaration was used, since he would be forced to call the declarant as his
own witness.' 6
13. The declarant is not on the witness stand; his statement is being related
by a witness who heard it. The witness cannot testify as to how the declarant
perceived the event of the circumstances which prom p ted his declaration. Similarly, the witness cannot testify to the accuracy of the cecarant's memory. A third
danger is that the language of the declaration may be subject to interpretation and
the witness would not be able to assist in determining what the declarant meant
by the words he used.
14. Normally, when the proponent's evidence is in a form that is subject to
cross-examination. In the case of hearsay, the opponent can obtain meaningful
cross-examination as to the truth of the statement only by bringing the declarant
into court.

15. See Note, CaliforniaAdmits DeclarationsAgainst Penal Interest Regardless of Unavailability, 17 STA.N. L. REv. 822, 827 (1965). The admission of hear-

say evidence has generally been held not to violate a criminal defendant's right
to confrontation guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and
made applicable to the states by Pointer v. Texas, 880 U.S. 400 (1965). Cases
wherein hearsay evidence has held not to violate the confrontation clause include:
California v. Green, 899 U.S. 149 (1970); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237
(1895). See also Stein v. New York, 846 U.S. 156, 196 (1953), where the court
expressly rejected the notion that the hearsay evidence rule should be read into
the fourteenth amendment. See C. McCormick, supra note 5, § 252, at 607.
16. Missouri law does not permit a party to impeach his own witness. See,
e.g., Waller v. Oliver, 296 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1956); Frank v. Wabash R.R., 295
S.W.2d 16 (Mo. 1956); Ross, Impeaching One's Own Witness in Missouri, 87
Mo. L. Bnv. 507 (1972). There are limited exceptions to this rule, however.
Impeachment is allowed if the proponent is surprised or if the witness is a hostile
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Although some distinguished authorities on the law of evidence have
advocated the abandonment of the unavailability requirement, 17 the rationale
for such a change shows some weak points upon critical analysis. Some
proponents for amendment of the current majority rule compare declarations against interest to spontaneous declarations, a type of hearsay which
is admissible regardless of availability of the speaker.18 A comparison of the
hearsay dangers involved in decalarations against interest with those in
spontaneous declarations demonstrates the fallacy of this comparison. The
latter type of hearsay evidence is intrinsically more reliable than the former.
There is no memory problem in a spontaneous declaration with regard to
the declarant because the statement is made immediately after the event.
The only memory which needs to be tested is that of the witness who is
repeating declarant's remark in court. Since this witness is on the stand, he
is subject to cross-examination and his memory can thus be satisfactorily
tested. In contrast to this situation is the case of declarations against interest. Such statements may be spoken long after the declarant's recollections
have been blurred by time and intervening events. This substantial memory
problem must be considered in comparing these two exceptions.
Another reason why the spontaneous utterance partakes of a greater
reliability is perception. In the case of a spontaneous utterance, the reporting
witness frequently provides a check on the declarant's perception because
1?e was, by definition, sufficiently proximate to the scene of the declaration
to hear it. He probably (but not necessarily) witnessed either the actual
event or at least the surrounding circumstances of the event which prompted
the declarant's statement, and may be cross-examined thereon. The reporter
of a declaration against interest usually has not observed the event on which
it was based, and hence an effective evaluation of the declarant's perception is impossible.
Both spontaneous declarations and declarations against interest have
some indicia of sincerity.' 9 As the above discussion indicates, however, the
rationale for the two exceptions are very different in other ways. The absence
of an unavailability requirement in connection with spontaneous declaration
witness. See, e.g., State v. Gordon, 391 S.W.2d 846, 848-49 (Mo. 1965)
(surprise); Mooney v. Terminal R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 352 Mo. 245, 260, 176
S.W.2d 605, 611 (1944) (hostile witness). Some cases have put other limitations
on these exceptions, such as requiring not only surprise, but also that the testimony be favorable to the opposing party. See Hughes v. Patriotic Ins. Co. of
America, 193 S.W.2d 958, 959 (St. L. Mo. App. 1946).
17. See note 5 supra.
18. Spontaneous declarations, traditionally called res gestae, cover several
types of declarations that are allowed into evidence as exceptions to the hearsay
rule without a showing of unavailability. The types of declarations covered are:
1) declarations of present bodily conition; 2) declarations of present mental
state; 8) excited utterances; and 4) declarations of present sense impressions.
See C. McComncx, supra note 5, § 288, at 686; 6 J. WiGmo E, Evm EC § 1745,
at 131 (3rd ed. 1940).
19. The spontaneous declaration has sincerity safeguards since the declarant
does not have time to fabricate. See J. WiGmonE, supra note 18, § 1749, at 139.
The declaration against interest also has this safeguard, because it is unlikely that
one will falsify to his own disadvantage. See 5 J. WiGMOPE, supra note 11, § 1457,
at 262-63.
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is probably not sufficient justification for eliminating this requirement for
declarations against interest.
Proponents of eliminating the unavailability requirement have also
compared the declaration against interest to the hearsay exception for
20
admissions of a party opponent, which does not require unavailability.
Although upon first glance one might assume that the same logic supports
both exceptions, careful analysis reveals that the rationale for admitting
admissions is entirely different than the rationale supporting declarations
against interest. In the latter case the only circumstance which counterbalances the presence of the four hearsay dangers is the notion that one is
unlikely to falsify to his own disadvantage. Contrarily, the impetus for
admitting admissions is that the objecting party is also the declarant. Here
the basis is not veracity but barnyard justice; the objector shall not be heard
to complain that he is not given an opportunity to cross-examine himself.
If he wishes to explain the out-of-court statement he has merely to take the
stand and do so. The simple mechanics inherent in proving an opponent's
out-of-court statement, 21 not inherent trustworthiness, constitutes the rationale for the admissions exception. Since the logic underlying each of
these hearsay exceptions is so different, it is fallacious to say that because
one does not require unavailability, the other should not either.
There are other alternatives which, if coupled with the elimination of
the unavailability requirement for declarations against interest, would make
the proposed change more acceptable. One possibility is to allow the proponent of the out-of-court declaration to put his declaration into evidence,
but only on condition that he produce the declarant, if available, and allow
his opponent to cross-examine the declarant as though he were a hostile
witness. 22 Another more extreme approach would retain the unavailability
requirement as to declarations against interest, but allow a party to impeach
his own witness,23 and allow prior inconsistent statements to be substantive
evidence of their contents. 24 It is very possible that an important but un-

20. See C. McCoi.zicv, supra note 5, § 262, at 628.
21. E. MORAN, BAsIc PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 259 (1957); C. McCoaMcK,
supra note 5, § 262, at 628.
22. See 52 CORNELL L. REv. 301, 809 (1967). Allowing the opponent to
cross-examine the declarant as a hostile witness would allow him to impeach the
declarant. See note 16 supra.
23. If the declarant failed to make the same declaration on the stand, the
attorney would at least be able to show the jury that the declarant had made a
different statement previously in order to question his credibility.
24. Presently, Missouri allows the introduction of prior inconsistent statements for the limited purpose of impeachment. State v. Granberry, 491 S.W.2d
528 (Mo. En Banc 1973). If prior inconsistent statements were substantive evidence, the declarations against interest could be heard by the jury and used as
evidence by them in reaching their results. Although the court has recently
rejected a move to allow prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence in
Granberry, perhaps a small exception could be carved out. This has been done
for prior inconsistent statements contained in the deposition of the witness.
Pulitzer v. Chapman, 85 S.W.2d 400 (Mo. 1935). The court would need only to
allow prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence where such statements
are also declarations against interest.
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stated factor behind the court's inclination to do away with the unavailability requirement is a desire to admit out-of-court statements as substantive evidence. Once a witness is called, his prior inconsistent statements
cannot be used as substantive evidence. Even though the statement in Orr
was a prior inconsistent statement, the court was able to admit it as substantive evidence because it was also a declaration against interest. A third
possible alternative would require that the witness be called if available,
but would allow an out-of-court declaration against interest to be used
substantively as well as to impeach. The latter may be the better alternative,
since it gives the jury the benefit of all available evidence, the witness' incourt testimony as well as his prior out-of-court declaration.
Admitting declaration against interest without regard to unavailability
would not be desirable. Such a move, while solving some of the problems
caused by the present application of the unavailability requirement in declarations against interest could create other problems. The court should carefully consider other alternatives before discarding outright the unavailability
requirement.
M A-c A. SmamA

NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATIONLIABILITY OF ACCOUNTANTS TO THIRD PARTIESTHE PRIVITY REQUIREMENT
Aluma Kraft ManufacturingCo. v. Elmer Fox & Co.'
Solmica, Incorporated, contracted to purchase 80 percent of Aluma
Kraft's stock at a price equal to the book value of the shares on June 30,
1969. The contract provided that Aluma Kraft would supply financial statements needed to compute the sale price. Elmer Fox & Company, Aluma
Kraft's auditor, prepared and furnished statements to Aluma Kraft which
overstated book value by $150,000. In reliance on these statements, Solmica
purchased the Aluma Kraft stock at an inflated price. Solmica sued Fox for
damages, but the circuit court dismissed the case for lack of privity.2
On appeal, Solmica's principal theory of recovery was that Fox negligently performed the audit with knowledge that Solmica would use and
rely on the statements in determining the stock's price.3 Fox's defense was
that Solmica had not stated a cause of action because Solmica and Fox were
not in privity. 4 The St. Louis District of the Missouri Court of Appeals held
that privity of contract between plaintiff and defendant was not essential

1. 498 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973).
2. Id. at 379.
8. Solrnica also contended that Missouri statutes (§§ 326.111, .120, RSMo
1969) and various rules regulating the conduct of and establishing standards for
accountants create a cause of action for negligence. The court rejected this theory,
saying that although the statutes could be used in determining the standard of
care required of an accountant, the statutes impose criminal penalties only and do
not create independent civil actions. 498 S.W.2d at 880-81.
4. Id. at 279-80.
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on the facts presented, and that therefore, the plaintiffs case was submissible
to the jury.'
The essential issue presented by this case is jury submissibility. Ultimately, the court had to decide if plaintiff had presented a case which,
under court-devised standards, was submissible to the jury. To fully understand the decision and the standards that the court considered in determining that Solmica's case was submissible, the concept of privity of
contract as a defense must be considered.
The idea that privity of contract is required between parties before
one can recover for negligence was first presented in Winterbottom v.
Wright.6There, a mail coach driver was denied recovery for injuries caused
by the defendant's faulty maintenance of his coach because he was not in
privity with the defendant-mechanic. 7 The court reasoned that if privity
were not required, the number of such actions would be limitless. 8 As a
consequence, defendant was deemed immune from liability for negligent
acts to all but those with whom he was in privity of contract. This inclusive
perimeter of immunity resulted from an erroneous juxtaposition of contract
law with tort law. Under the privity doctrine, there is no analysis of the
probability of the resulting harm stemming from the act. There is only a
cursory look to determine whether privity of contract existed between the
plaintiff and defendant.9 If such a relation existed, then the court allows the
case to reach the jury; if not, the defendant wins a dismissal.
The Winterbottom perimeter of immunity was slightly retracted in the
case of Glanzer v. Shepard.10 There, a bean seller had asked defendants,
public weighers, to weigh beans and furnish plaintiff buyer with a copy of
the certificate; the certificate overstated the weight substantially. The court
sustained a directed verdict for plaintiff because, although he had not
actually contracted with the defendant, "the end and aim of the transaction was to inform the plaintiff of the weight."" In imposing tort liability
to parties not actually in privity, however, the court again erroneously
focused, not on the defendant's negligent act and a determination on
whether its effect on the plaintiff was probable, but rather on the contract
and whether its end and aim was to affect the plaintiff. The perimeter
of immunity was retracted slightly, but the court's analysis remained
contract-oriented.
In a subsequent case, Ultramares v. Touche,' 2 the same court denied
the submissibility of a third party's negligence case against an accounting

5. Id. at 879.

6. 10 M. &W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).

7. Id. at 114-15, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405.
8. Id. at 114-15, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405.
9. See W. PIossER, THa LAw OF ToRTs §98 (4th ed. 1971).
10. 283 N.Y. 286, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
11. Id. at 238-39, 185 N.E. at 275. For an extensive discussion of the
proposition that a defendant might be liable if (1) he knows the identity of the
plaintiff at the time of the negligent audit, and (2) the transmission of the statement to the plaintiff was the end and aim of the audit, see Hallet, Auditors'
Responsibilityfor Misrepresentation,44 WAsm. L. Rlv. 139 (1968).
12. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
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firm for erroneous balance sheets. 13 The defendant knew that the sheets
were generally supplied to a variety of third parties, but did not know the
particular parties who would rely on them. The court erroneously required
privity, because a mistake or miscalculation "may expose accountants to a
liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an
indeterminate class." 14 Judge Cardozo noted that in Glanzer there was a
connection so close between the plaintiff and defendant as to approach
privity because defendant knew the "end and aim" of the transaction was
to benefit that particular plaintiff.15 In Ultramares, on the other hand, the
plaintiffs identity was unknown to the defendant. Judge Cardozo left open
the possibility of recovery without privity for an audit fraudulently done or
for a reckless misstatement, 1 and stated that evidence of negligence may
sustain an inference of fraud.1 7 To recover for mere negligence, however,
the injured party not in privity must establish the criteria set forth in
Glanzer.' The Ultramares court refused to constrict the perimeter of
immunity further than Glanzer and again resorted to the privity label as
justification for this failure.
Where plaintiff has suffered physical harm, courts have traditionally
been reluctant to require privity.19 Where the loss is purely economic, however, the privity doctrine has more vitality.2 0 A few courts, fearing the

18. Id. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448. Recovery might be allowed, however, on a
theory that fraud could be inferred from the defendants negligence. Id. at 190-91,
174 N.E. at 449.
14. Id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
15. Id. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 445-46.
16. Id. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448.
17. Id. at 190-91, 174 N.E. at 449.
18. Id. at 182-88, 174 N.E. at 445-46. The idea that negligence can be
actionable without privity (if the defendant knew of the plaintiff's intended
reliance and Glanzers "end and aim" test is met) is somewhat clouded in New
York by State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 15 N.E.2d 416, 418 (1932), in which the
court said:
[I]n the absence of a contractual relationship or its equivalent,
accountants cannot be held liable for ordinary negligence in preparing
a certified balance sheet even though they are aware that the balance
sheet will be used to obtain credit.
This statement can, however, be seen as merely reasserting Judge Cardozo's
concept of a need to limit liability to a determinate class instead of eliminating
an action of negligence without privity of contract. See Investment Corporation
of Florida v. Buchanan, 208 So. 2d 291 (Fla. App. 1968); 46 A.L.R. 3d 979
(1972).
19. Mac Pherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916);
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963).
See W. Pnossrn, T ELA.w OF TORTS §§96-97 (4th ed. 1971); Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Persons, 19 Vend. L. Rev. 231 (1966); Prosser, The Fall of
the Citadel, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 791 (1966); Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 1111 (1960).
20. See Prosser, Misrepresentationand Third Persons, 19 Vand. L. Rev. 231,
282 (1966). Plaintiffs not in privity with the defendant have occasionally recovered on theories of fraud and third party beneficiary contract. Fraud cases
include Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen, 181 N.Y.S.2d 20, aff d., 285 App. Div.
867, 137 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1954); State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15
N.E.2d 416 (1938) (gross negligence amounting to fraud); Ultramares v. Touche,
255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). See also Annot. 46 A.L.R.3d 979, 996
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss3/8
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spectre of unlimited liability to an unlimited class, 21 have blindly required
actual privity of contract. 22 These courts would dismiss for lack of privity

even though the defendant knew that a particular plaintiff would rely on
his work.23 Other courts have adopted the Glanzer position,2 4 but have
refused to further relax the privity requirement.

In a broad departure from privity, Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin 25

asserted that an accountant should be liable for a negligent statement relied
on "by actually foreseen and limited classes of persons." 26 This view requires,
not that a particular individual be known to the defendant, but only that
defendant know of a limited class to which the plaintiff belongs. The Rusch
(1972) (lsting the large number of courts recognizing fraud as a basis for an
accountant's liability to a third party not in privity).
Federal securities legislation may more readily allow for recovery. See 15
U.S.C. § 77k (1964); 15 U.S.C. §78j (b) (1970); 17 C.F.R. § 240, 10(b) (5);
Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Fischer v.
Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Kurland, Accountant's Legal LiabilityUltramares to Barchris, 25 BusINuss LAwYEn 155 (1969) (asserting that federal
securities legislation will preclude the application of Ultramares).
21. See Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 197 (1879); O'Connor v.

Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1937).
22. See Canaveral Capital Corp. v. Bruce, 214 So. 2d 505 (Fla. App. 1968);

Sickler v. Indian River Abstract & Guaranty Co., 142 Fla. 528, 195 So. 195
(1940); Blank v. Kartz, 850 Mass. 779, 216 N.E.2d 110 (1966); Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen 131 N.Y.S.2d 20, affd 285 App. Div. 867, 137 N.Y.S.2d 829
(1954); Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406, 107 A. 783 (1919). Annot. 46 A.L.R.3d

979 (1972).
23. Stephens Industries, Inc. v. Haskins, 843 F.2d 357, 359 (10th Cir 1971),

stated that "as to third parties-even those who the accountant knew or should have
known were relying on his audit-liability can be founded only upon fraudulent
conduct, and proof of mere negligence will not suffice."
24. See Shatterproof Glass Corporation v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1971), following RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) Or ToRTs §552, at 14 (Tent.
Draft No. 12, 1966). The Restatement extends liability to loss suffered

(a) by the person or one of the persons for whose benefit and

guidance he intends to supply the information, or knows that the
recipient intends to supply it; and through reliance upon it in a transaction which he intends the information to influence, or knows that the
recipient so intends, or in a substantially similar transaction.
C.I.T. Financial Corp. v. Glover, 224 F.2d 44 (2nd Cir. 1955) (citing Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441, with approval and requiring
that the financial reports be made for the primary benefit of the plaintiff).
Lucas v. Hamm 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 689, (1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 987 (1962) (rejecting the privity requirement and imposing a balancing test
weighing (1) the extent to which the transmission was meant to affect the plaintiff, (2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (3) the degree of certainty
that plaintiff was injured, (4) the closeness of connection between the plaintiff's injury and the defendants act, and (5) the policy of preventing future
harm); Annot. 46 A.L.R. 3d 979; Rozney v. Marnul, 43 Ill.
2d 54, 250 N.E.2d
656 (1969) (extending recovery to those who might foreseeably rely on defendant's inaccurate survey if the class is limited to a comparatively small group);
Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 895 (Ia. 1969) (allowing recovery to those actually
known to the defendant as prospective users of the audit and at vhom the transaction was aimed); See also Tartera v. Palumbo, 453 S.W.2d 780 (Tenn. 1970)
(reliance on negligent survey).
25. 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968).
26. Id. at 93.
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decision rejected the "unlimited liability" spectre the Ultramares court"
used to justify the privity requirement.28 The Rusch case was cited in Rhode
Island Hospital Trust National Bank v. Swartz,2 9 in which a bank recovered
from a negligent accountant because he knew the bank would rely on his
audit of a prospective borrower.30 In both the Rusch and Rhode Island cases,
the court could have allowed the plaintiff to get to the jury by merely relying
on the Glanzer end and aim test, since the defendant knew that the
individual plaintiff would rely on his work.8 ' In each case, however, the
court indicates a desire to shrink the perimeter of immunity to make the
case submissible, not merely to a plaintiff specifically known to the defendant, but to all plaintiffs in an actually foreseen and limited class.32
Missouri courts allow recovery for negligence without privity when the
plaintiff has suffered physical harm.83 Early Missouri cases denied recovery
for economic loss without privity, using the Ultramares"indefinite liability"
argument.8 4 More recent decisions have relaxed the privity requirement to
the same degree as Glanzer, but have employed the same erroneous, con3 5 an indemnitor
tract-oriented analysis. In Westerhold v. Carroll,
of a surety
on a performance bond sued an architect for certifying an incorrect amount
of material and work used in construction. Although there was no privity
between plaintiff and defendant, the court, as in Glanzer, found the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant to be so close as to approach
privity.30 The court believed that requiring a close relationship eliminated
the danger of unlimited liability to an indeterminate class.37 No such relationship existed in Anderson v. Boone County Abstract Company,38 where
defendant abstractor prepared a certified abstract which subsequently
passed from the original owner through two other owners to the plaintiff.
The court said defendant was not liable because he had no reason to expect
that the plaintiff would rely.3 9 In Slate v. Boone County Abstract Com27. 255 N.Y. at 181, 174 N.E. at 445.
28. 284 F. Supp. at 91. The court asks, "Why should an innocent reliant
party be forced to carry the weighty burden of an accountant's professional'malpractice? Isn't the risk of loss more easily distributed and fairly spread by imposing
it on the accounting profession, which can pass the cost insuring against, the risk
onto its customers, who in turn pass the cost onto the entire consuming public?
29. 455 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1972).
30. Id. at 851.
31. Id. at 851, 284 F. Supp. at 91.
32. Id. at 851, 284 F. Supp. at 93.

33. Lesser v. William Holliday Cord Assoc., Inc. 349 F.2d 490 (8th Cir.
1965); Wolfmeyer v. Otis Elevator Company, 262 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. 1953).
34. See Gordon v. Livingston, 12 Mo. App. 267 (1882); Roddy v. Missouri
Pac. Ry., 104 Mo. 234, 15 S.W. 1112 (1891); Zweigardt v. Birdseye, 57 Mo.
App. 462 (1894) (applied privity requirement even where plaintiff knew specifia that the defendant would rely on his abstract of title). Schade v. Gehner,
183 Mo. 252, 34 S.W. 576 (1896).
35. 419 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. 1967).

36. Id. at 78. See Wieler, Torts- Negligent Performance of a ContractPrivity: Have the Exceptions Finally Swallowed the Rule?, 83 Mo. L. REv. 531
(1968).

37. Id. at 79.

38. 418 S.W.2d 123 (Mo. 1967).
89. Id. at 130.
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pany,40 however, defendant supplied an abstract to the owner knowing that
plaintiff, a prospective buyer, would rely on it.41 The court allowed recovery
since, as in Glanzer, the "end and aim" of the transaction between the defen42
dant and the purchaser of the abstract was for the benefit of the plaintiff.
As these cases indicate, in Missouri the perimeter of immunity has been identical with that of Glanzer. Unlike the personal injury area, little attempt has
been made to analyze economic injury cases using the traditional tort terms
of causation in fact and direct and probable consequences. 43 The courts
establish an arbitrary perimeter of immunity by focusing on the contract,
and do not apply traditional negligence theory. Such analysis denies
recovery to a large class of plaintiffs by hinging jury submissibility on finding privity or meeting the Glanzer exception.
In Aluma Kraft, there is some indication that the court wishes to
further relax the perimeter of immunity and allow recovery to a limited and
foreseeable class of plaintiffs not individually known to the defendant. The
court, citing Rusch,44 discusses the growing trend to permit submission of
such cases to the jury.45 The opinion rejects the privity requirement where
the defendant knows that the individual plaintiff will rely on the defendant's acts or knows that the recipient intends to supply the information to
prospective users. 48 The court also disparages the "unlimited liability" concept that has been the main justification for the privity requirement. 47
Despite this expansive language, the court fails to extend liability
much beyond Glanzer. The court states that whether the defendant will be
held liable to a third party not in privity involves the balancing of the
following factors: 1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to
affect the plaintiff; 2) the foreseeability of harm to him; 3) the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; and 4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered. 48 In effect,
the court is merely delineating the limits of the immunity established by the
Glanzer end and aim test in traditional tort terms. The factors taking into
account the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the
plaintiff and the foreseeability of harm to him, are difficult to distinguish
from the Glanzer and Westerhold requirement that the plaintiff be known
to the defendant, and that the end and aim of the transaction be to affect
the plaintiff. In addition, the first factor still suggests contract-oriented
analysis rather than traditional tort analysis.

40. 432 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1968).
41. Id. at 806. See Maher, The Liability of Abstractors in Missouri, 34 Mo.
L. lBv. 420 (1969).
42. 432 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. 1968).
43. See State ex rel. Blond v. Stubbs 485 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. App. D. K.C.
1972); and State ex rel. Smith v. Weinstein 898 S.W.2d 41 (St. L. Mo. App.
1965).
44. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
45. 493 S.W.2d at 382-83.
-

46. Id. at 383.
47. Id. at 882-84.
48. Id. at 883.
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The Aluma Kraft court notes the logical faults of the unlimited liability

basis for the privity rule,49 yet still applies a strict foreseeability rule. If
privity has no basis, then why limit liability to strictly foreseeable plaintiffs?
In other negligence areas, such as personal injury cases, courts use a direct
and probable consequence test. 0 The answer may be found in the court's
statement that "the extension of limits of liability should be done on a 'easeby-case basis' and "[w] e believe that Westerhold and Glanzer are authority
to reject the requirement of privity under the facts here." 5' Nevertheless,
by analyzing the economic injury cases through contract terms and concepts
rather than negligence theory, the court perpetuates an arbitrary, though
more constricted, perimeter of immunity, leaving the plaintiff less able to
submit his case to a jury than in personal injury cases.

JomN R. SIsS

PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS AS SUBSTANTIVE
EVIDENCE-MISSOURI RETAINS THE ORTHODOX RULE
State v. Cranberry'
James Granberry and Kenneth Hackett were indicted for murder. The
State, however, dismissed its case against Hackett after he made a videotaped statement implicating Granberry in the crime. At Granberry's trial,
the State called Hackett as a witness. Hackett testified that Granberry was
not involved in the crime. The State thereupon claimed surprise, and was
given leave to impeach its own witness. 2 The State questioned Hackett as

49. Id. at 383-84.
50. In State ex rel. Smith v. Weinstein, 398 S.W.2d 41, (St. L. Mo. App.
1965), the plaintiff was injured in a wreck with car driven by defendant, Smith.
On the way to the hospital, plaintiff was again injured when the ambulance was
involved in a wreck. In holding the defendant Smith liable for the plaintiffs
injuries in both accidents, the court said:
[a] person who has received an injury due to the negligence of another
is entitled to recover all damage proximately traceable to the primary
negligence, including the subsequent aggravation which the law regards
as a sequence and natural result likely to flow from the original injury,
even though there may have been some intervening agency contributing
to the result.
Id. at 44. This case was followed in State ex rel. Blond v. Stubbs 485 S.W.2d
152, 155 (Mo. App. D.K.C. 1972). See Comment, Auditor's Responsibility for
Misrepresentations:Inadequate Protection for Users of Financial Statement. 44
Wash. L. Rev. 139, 179 (1968) (arguing for expanded liability since the accountants work is directed primarily at third parties and the accountant actively
solicits their reliance).
See also Annot. 46 A.L.R.3d 979 (1972).
51. Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378, 382 (Mo.
App., D. St. L. 1973).
1. 491 S.W.2d 528 (Mo. En Banc 1973).
2. See Ross, Impeaching One's Own Witness in Missouri, 87 Mo. L. REv.

507 (1972).
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to the video-taped statement and other statements 3 he had made implicating
Granberry. Granberry was convicted. On appeal, Granberry contended
that Hackett's prior inconsistent statements had been used as substantive
evidence of guilt.4 The Missouri Supreme Court agreed and reversed
Granberry's conviction. 5
In Granberry,the Missouri Supreme Court re-examined Missouri's position with respect to the use of prior inconsistent statements.0 The court
opted to retain its present position, 7 which is essentially the orthodox8
view with an exception for prior statements contained in depositions.

3. Hackett was questioned concerning statements made to an investigator,
to two attorneys for the State, to a police detective, and a deposition taken in a
case involving another defendant. 491 S.W.2d at 530.
4. The jury was instructed to use the out-of-court statements only in determining the credibility of the witness and not to use them substantively. The
alleged error occurred when the prosecutor over-emphasized the importance of
the prior statements in his closing argument.
5. Five judges (Judges Donnelly, Henley, Seiler, Finch and Holman)
thought the emphasis placed on the prior statements resulted in their substantive
use. Judges Morgan and Bardgett felt that "the closing argument of the state was
legitimate retaliatory argument and did not even constitute non-prejudicial error".
491 S.W.2d at 539.
6. Prior inconsistent statements are offered in two situations. The most
common situation is where a witness, after testifying in direct examination, is
cross-examined about a prior inconsistent statement he has made. The other
instance is where a witness testifies on direct examination and his testimony surprises the direct examiner. The direct examiner is then given leave to impeach his
own witness, and in impeaching the witness, the prior inconsistent statement is
introduced. The latter situation is involved in Cranberry.In the first situation, the
cross-examiner impeaches the witness and the direct examiner seeks to rehabilitate
him. In the second situation, the direct examiner impeaches and the crossexaminer seeks to rehabilitate. Despite the role reversal, however, the same
analysis applies to both situations.
Much depends on the witness' response to the questions concerning the
prior inconsistent statement. 1) Where the witness admits making the prior inconsistent statement and also admits its truth, thereby abandoning his former in-court
testimony, there is no problem with admissibility of the prior statement. The witness had adopted the prior statement as his present testimony and can be crossexamined upon it. 2) The classic prior inconsistent statement situation arises where
the witness admits making the statement but denies its truth. 3) A difficult problem arises where the witness denies making the prior statement. See note 37, infra.
7. Five judges (Judges Donnelly, Henley, Seiler, Morgan and Bardgett)
favored retention of the orthodox view. Judges Finch and Holman endorsed the
unorthodox position, but reversed the conviction because some of the statements
admitted did not qualify for substantive admission under their proposed rule.
8. The Missouri position with respect to criminal cases, as stated by Judge
Donnelly, is:
(2) if a witness is present at trial (whether he testifies at trial or
not), his deposition, if taken by the State under the provisions of Art. I.
§ 18(b), supra, is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule, and so far
as it is admissible under other rules of evidence, may be used by the
State and "accepted as substantive proof of the facts stated" in the
deposition; and
(3) if a witness is not present at trial, and it appears he is dead or
that the State has made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at
trial ... his deposition, if taken by the State under the provisions of
Art. I, § 18(b), supra, is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule,
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The orthodox view holds that a prior inconsistent statement made by
a witness is admissible
to impeach or discredit the witness, but not as
9
substantive evidence.
The orthodox view has stirred much criticism'0 and several proposals
for change have been made.' Missouri was one of the first jurisdictions to
make inroads into the orthodox view.' 2 In Pulitzer v. Chapman 3 the Missouri Supreme Court allowed a prior inconsistent statement in a witness'4
deposition taken in the same civil case to be used as substantive evidence.'
In 1945, the Pulitzer position was extended to felony cases by a new provision in the Missouri Constitution. 5 Missouri has not, however, further
liberalized its position.'
The basis of the orthodox view is that a prior inconsistent statement is
hearsay, and therefore is inadmissible as substantive evidence. 17 Hearsay is
inadmissible as substantive evidence because the finder of fact cannot8
adequately test the declarant's perception, memory, narration, and sincerity.'
The three dangers of hearsay are: (1) the extrajudicial statement is not
made under oath; (2) the trier of fact cannot observe the declarant's
demeanor as he makes the statement; and (3) there was no opportunity for
cross-examination when the statement was made. 19 Proponents of the ortho-

and, so far as it is admissible, under other rules of evidence, may be
used by the State and "accepted as substantive proof of the facts stated"
in the deposition.
491 S.W.2d at 531.
With respect to civil cases, the court reaffirmed the position taken in
Pulitzer v. Chapman, 337 Mo. 298, 85 S.W.2d 400 (1935) (a prior inconsistent
statement made by a witness in a deposition in the same case can be used as
substantive evidence).
9. Annot., 133 A.L.R. 1454, 1455 (1941).
10. See 3A, J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018 (Chad. Rev. 1970): "Here,
however, by hypothesis the witness is present and subject to cross-examination.
There is ample opportunity to test him as to the basis for his former statement.
The whole purpose of the hearsay rule has already been satisfied." See, Morgan,
Hearsay Dangersand the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 Hazv. L. REv.
177, 192-96 (1948); McCoivucic, The Turncoat Witness-Previous Statements as
Substantive Evidence, 25 TExAs L. REv. 573 (1947).
11. PRtop. Frw. R. Evw. 801(d)1 (1972). (However, the House Amendment
to the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence modified Rule 801(d)1 to essentially
adopt the orthodox rule. H.R. 5463 as amended by the Subcommittee on Criminal
justice, House Committee on the Judiciary). Model Code of Evidence, Rule 503
(1942); Uzrnorm RULEs OF EVIDENCE 63 (1947).

12. McCormick, The Turncoat Witness-Previous Statements as Substantive
REV. 573, 584 (1947).

Evidence, 25 TExAs L.

13. 337 Mo. 298, 85 S.W.2d 411 (1935).
14. Id. at 320, 85 S.W.2d at 441. The Cranberry court reaffirmed the
Pu]itzer position. 491 S.W.2d at 531.
15. MO. CoNsT. art. I, § 18(b).
16. 491 S.W.2d at 531.
17. Ruhala v. Roby, 379 Mich. 102, 150 N.W.2d 146 (1967); State v.
Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 285 N.W. 898 (1939), 3A J. WiGmoBE, EVIDENCE
§ 1018 (Chad. Rev. 1970); C. McCowmvcKc, EVmENCE § 251 (2d Ed. 1972).
18. C. McConNcx, EVmENCE § 245 (2d Ed. 1972).
19. C. McConmcx, EVIDENCE § 245 (2d Ed. 1972).
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dox rule assert that prior
statements possess the three dangers characteristic
20
of hearsay evidence.

Critics of the orthodox rule, on the other hand, contend that the hearsay dangers are not present because the declarant is in court and subject to
cross-examination upon his prior statement. They argue that, although the
prior extrajudicial statement was not made under oath, the oath requirement is satisfied because the declarant is cross-examined under oath at trial
concerning his prior statement. 21 The oath, in any case, is not regarded as

the principal safeguard of the trustworthiness of the testimony. 22 Concerning the second hearsay danger, critics of the orthodox view contend that the
opportunity to observe the witness' in-court testimony about his prior state-

ment compensates for the trier of fact's inability to23 observe the witness'

demeanor at the time the prior statement was made.
The real crux of the argument in support of the orthodox view is that
the rule against hearsay requires an opportunity for immediate cross-examination, that delayed cross-examination at trial on the prior statement is

inadequate. 24 The rationale for this requirement has never been articulated
clearly.25 In his concurring opinion in Granberry, Judge Seller took this

20. See, e.g., State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 361-62, 285 N.W. 898, 901
(1939).
21. See note 10, supra.
22. Professor McCormick stated, "Probably most trial lawyers and most
students in the field of evidence would now agree that the oath and the penalties
of perjury, though of substantial value, are not the principal safeguard of the
trustworthiness of testimony." McCormick, The Turncoat Witness, 25 TExAs L.
REv.573, 576 (1947).
23. Judge Learned Hand said, "If from all that the jury see of the witness,
they conclude that what he says now is not the truth, but what he said before,
they are none the less deciding from what they see and hear of that person and
in court." DiCarlo v. U.S., 6 F.2d 364 at 368 (2nd Cir. 1925).
24. Ruhala v. Roby, 379 Mich. 102, 150 N.W.2d 146 (1967); State v.
Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 285 N.W. 898 (1935). Cf. State v. Mlynczak, 268 Minn.
417, 180 N.W.2d 53 (1964).
25. In State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 285 N.W. 898 (1939), Justice Stone
attempted an explanation for holding the hearsay rule required an opportunity for
immediate cross-examination:
The chief merit of cross-examination is not that at some future time it
gives the party opponent the right to disseet adverse testimony. Its
principal virtue is in its immediate application of the testing process. Its
strokes fall while the iron is hot. False testimony is apt to harden and
become unyielding to the blows of truth in proportion as the witness has
opportuni for reconsideration and influence by the suggestion of others,
whose interest may be, and often is, to maintain falsehood rather than
truth.
Id. at 362, 285 N.W. at 901.
Justice Stone's rationale has been questioned. Professor Morgan argues,
Why does falsehood harden any more quickly or unyielding than truth?
What has become of the idea that truth is eternal and, though crushed
to earth, will rise again? Isn't the opportunity for reconsideration and for
baneful influence by others even more likely to color the later testimony
than the prior statement?
Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept 62 HAMv.
L. REv. 177, 193 (1948).
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approach, holding that prior inconsistent statements are inadmissible as
substantive evidence because later cross-examination as to these statements
is ineffective. 20 Judge Seiler relied on an opinion by the Michigan Supreme
Court in Ruhala v. Roby, 27 in which two hypothetical cross-examinations
were compared.2 8 In the first hypothetical, the cross-examiner induces the
witness to change his testimony. The witness' admission that he was mistaken
on direct examination makes a strong impression on the jury. The witness'
discredited statement is probably wiped from the jury's collective mind. 29
This cross-examination is very effective.
In the second hypothetical, the witness on direct examination testifies
favorably to the cross-examiner. Claiming surprise, the direct examiner
impeaches the witness with a prior inconsistent statement. On cross-examination, the cross-examiner can only try to explain away the prior inconsistency.
Because the witness' in-court testimony favored the cross-examiner, he cannot cross-examine the witness in an adversary manner. All he can do is have
the witness repeat his testimony given on direct examination. As a result,
the prior statement is never discredited, the "ghost of the prior statement"
remains.30 In the analysis of the Ruhala court, the cross-examination in the
second hypothetical is ineffective.31 Because the prior inconsistent statement
cannot be effectively cross-examined, the court held that the prior
3 2 inconsistent statement should not be admitted as substantive evidence.

Justice Stone's argument that the hearsay rule requires an immediate
opportunity to cross-examine falters when applied to prior inconsistent statements.
Justice Stone fears that the testimony of the witness will "harden" if not tested
by immediate cross-examination. In the case of inconsistent statements, however,
the witness' testimony does not "harden", because, by hypothesis, the witness'
courtroom testimony has contradicted his prior statement.
26. 491 S.W.2d at 533 (concurring opinion).
27. 379 Mich. 102, 150 N.W.2d 146 (1967).
28. Id. at 125-28, 150 N.W.2d at 156-58.
29.
When a cross-examiner on timely cross-examination succeeds in
getting the witness to change his story, the integrity of the recantation
is apparent, and his original, recantedversion no longer stands as substantive evidence. If the only evidence of an essential fact in a lawsuit
were a statement made from the witness stand which the witness himself completely recanted and repudiated before he left the witness stand,
no one would seriously urge that a jury question had been made out.
Id. at 128, 150 N.W.2d at 158.
80. Id. at 128, 150 N.W.2d at 158.
31.
By these hypothetical examples we have tried to show the windmillfighting nature of stale cross-examination with respect to the prior statement. No matter how deadly the thrust of the cross-examiner, the ghost
of the prior statement stands. His questions will always sound like
attempts to permit the witness to explain why he changed his story
before coming to court, with the jury being left to infer that he might
have been induced to change his story in the intervening months or
years, for some unrevealed and sinister reason.
Id,at 128, 150 N.W.2d at 158.
32, Id. at 128, 150 N.W.2d at 163. In both situations in which prior inconsistent statements are introduced, discussed in note 6, supra, the Ruhala court was
concerned with the position of the party harmed by the prior inconsistent statehttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss3/8

30

et al.: Recent Cases
19741

RECENT CASES

Admittedly there is a difference in the two cross-examinations. The
cross-examination in the first hypothetical has a more powerful effect on
the jury. The witness' recantation is more striking when done in the jury's
presence. The effectiveness of the second hypothetical cross-examination,
however, depends upon how credibly the witness explains away the prior
statement. The Michigan court concluded, based on a comparison of the two
cross-examinations, that the second hypothetical cross-examination is less
34

effective.83 Judge Seller, in his concurring opinion in Granberry, agrees.
This analysis, however, by-passes the main issue. The question is not which
cross-examination is more effective; rather the question is whether the
second cross-examination is so ineffective as to mandate the inadmissibility
of the prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence. The expressed
reason for the Ruhala court's conclusion is that the cross-examiner5 could
never completely explain away the prior statement.88 The court cannot, however, mean that "effective" cross-examination occurs only when the crossexamination explains away the prior statement and convinces the jury to
believe the in-court testimony. If so, the substantive admissibility of the
prior statement would hinge on the witness' effectiveness in explaining it
away. The court must mean that the cross-examination is ineffective because
it is somehow "unfair" to burden the cross-examiner with explaining away
the prior statement. But why such a requirement is unfair is not discemable.
On the contrary, it seems unfair to allow a party to use a witness' favorable
testimony without requiring him to explain away the witness' prior, unfavor8 7
able, inconsistent statement
ment. If the prior statement is introduced on cross-examination, the direct examiner,
on redirect examination, would have the task of explaining away the prior inconsistent statement in an attempt to rehabilitate the witness. In the situation where
the prior statement is introduced on direct examination, after a showing of surprise,
the cross-examiner would have to explain away the prior inconsistent statement.
83. Ruhala v. Roby, 379 Mich. 102, 126, 150 N.W.2d 146, 157 (1967).
34. Judge Seller wrote
But Granberry's lawyers cannot cross-examine Hackett in actual factall they can do is to get him to repeat what he earlier said in his testimony-that is, that Cranberry was not there. They have no way to
destroy his prior statement because the only way they can meet it is to
have him repeat what he said on direct examination. This is not crossexamination at all, nor is there any way the witness can be subject to
genuine cross-examination by the party who wants to discredit the prior
statement.
State v. Granberry, 491 S.W.2d 528, 533 (Mo. En Bane 1973).
35. Where a prior inconsistent statement is introduced on cross-examination
and the witness denies the truth of the statement, it is the party conducting
redirect who has the task of explaining away the prior statement. See note 6 supra.
36. See note 31 supra.
37. In the second Ruhala cross-examination, the witness admits that he made
the prior statement, but denies the truth of that statement. The admission that the
prior statement was made gives the cross-examiner the opportunity to let the
witness explain away the prior statement. A more difficult problem arises when
the witness denies that he made the prior statement. In that case, the crossexaminer cannot explain away the prior statement because the witness does not
admit making the statement, and hence cannot offer an explanation for changing
his story. Whether the witness made the prior statement then becomes a question
of fact. If the trier of fact decides that no prior statement was made, then the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
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Even in the face of the Ruhala analysis, there may be good reasons to
admit prior inconsistent statements for their substance. Critics of the orthodox rule argue that prior inconsistent statements have sufficient indicia of
trustworthiness to be admitted as substantive evidence.38 The prior statement
is made nearer in time to the event than the in-court testimony, at a time
when the declarant's memory is accordingly more likely to be accurate.3 9 A
prior statement is less susceptible to outside influence as it is generally made
before there is a chance for such influence. 40 It is also argued that nothing
is gained by excluding prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence
because the limiting instruction is ineffective to preclude the substantive use
of the those statements by the jury.41 The modem authorities who have

alleged prior statement is disregarded. Should the trier of fact conclude, however,
that the prior statement was made, the statement may be given further
consideration.
Because cross-examination is effective only where the witness admits making
the prior statement, logic dictates that the unorthodox rule should be applied only
where the witness admits making the statement, thereby giving the cross-examiner
a chance to have the witness explain away the inconsistency. Such a rule, however, might foster perjury. A witness might falsely deny that he made the prior
statement in an attempt to prevent the prior statement from being admitted as
substantive evidence. In this regard, two different situations can be distinguished.
The first situation is where the witness' prior statement is unrecorded and comes
into the lawsuit when another witness testifies as to what the first witness told him.
In this case, if the first witness denies making the prior statement and the only
evidence is the conflicting testimony of the witnesses, there is a genuine question
as to whether the statement was actually made. No logical argument can be made
for the admission of the prior statement as substantive evidence, given that the
actual making of the statement is in doubt and that there is no opportunity for
effective cross-examination. Conversely, where there is substantial evidence that
the statement was actually made (statement proved to have been written or signed
by the witness or a video-taped statement), the witness's mere in-court denial of
making the statement should not render the statement inadmissible as substantive
evidence. The rationale for such substantive admissibility is that a party should
be stuck with the unfavorable, as well as the favorable, statements of its witnesses.
Professor McCormick's proposal, see n. 48, infra, is directed at insuring that
there is adequate proof that the prior statement was actually made, so as to avoid
injecting a collateral issue into the lawsuit. Although there is no indication that
Professor McCormick considered the situation where the witness denied making
the prior statement, his proposal does incorporate the suggestion discussed above.
38. These authorities would admit prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence, not as exceptions to the hearsay rule, but under a definition of
hearsay that excludes prior inconsistent statements. Jett v. Commonwealth, 436
S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1969); Gelhaar v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 230, 163 N.W.2d 609. See
also Pnop. FED. R. Evm. 801 (1972) (A House Amendment, however, modified
the proposed rule to adopt essentially the orthodox position); MODEL CODE OF
EviDENCE, Rule 503 (1942); CAL. Evm. CODE, § 1235 (West. Supp. 1966);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460 (a) (1964).
39. McCormick, The Turncoat Witness, 25 TEXAs L. REv. 573 at 577 (1947).
The text statement assumes, of course, that the verbal content of the statement can
be accurately established.
40. Id. at 578.
41. Professor McCormick says of the limiting instruction to the jury,
... such an instruction, as seems to be generally agreed is a mere verbal
ritual. The distinction is not one that most jurors would understand. If
they could understand it, it seems doubtful they would attempt to follow
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss3/8
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examined the question have concluded that prior statements 42
have none of
the hearsay dangers and should not be excluded as hearsay.
The unorthodox rule is not without problems. Such a rule was at one
time thought to violate a criminal defendant's right to confrontation under
the Sixth Amendment.43 In Californiav. Green,44 however, the U.S. Supreme
Court dispelled that thought.45 It has been suggested, 46 nevertheless, that
the orthodox rule may violate the confrontation clause of the Missouri
Constitution.4 7 Fabrication of the prior statement is also possible. WAith this
in mind, however, supporters of the unorthodox rule, have placed an additional requirement to safeguard against a fabricated prior statement. In his
concurring opinion in Granberry, Judge Finch endorsed Professor McCormick's proposal that prior statements be substantively admissible only if
there is adequate proof that the prior statement was actually made. 48

it. Trial judges seem to consider the instruction a futile gesture.
C. McCoMxucx, EVIDENCE (Hornbook Series 1954).
This, however, is a makeweight argument. Even if juries do not understand
the limiting instruction, no one has suggested that judges cannot comprehend and
apply it. If substantive admissibility of prior statements should turn on this
argument, different rules would apply dependent upon whether a judge or a jury
were considering the evidence. If valid reasons preclude admissibility of prior
inconsistent statements, the limiting instruction should be revised so as to
be effective.
42. See, e.g., C. McCoRnucK, EvmENcE § 251 (2nd Ed. 1972).
48. People v. Johnson, 68 Cal. 2d 646, 441 P.2d 111, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599
(1968) (testimony of a witness at a grand jury hearing without an opportunity
for the defendant to cross-examine was not substantively admissible, because the
California Supreme Court held the defendant's right to confrontation was
violated).
44. 899 U.S. 149 (1970).
45. In Green, the Court said, "Viewed historically, then, there is good reason
to conclude that the Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting a declarant's out-of-court statements, as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and
subject to full and effective cross-examination." Id. at 158. Green overruled
People v. Johnson, 68 Cal.2d 646, 441 P.2d 111, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1968).
46. State v. Granberry, 491 S.W.2d at 589 (Judge Bardgett dissenting).
47. MO. CONST. art. I, § 18(a).
48. Professor McCormick would allow a prior statement by a witness to be
used substantively if,
(1) the statement is proved to have been written or signed by the
declarant, or to have been given by him as testimony in a judicial or
official hearing, or the making of the statement is acknowledged by the
declarant in his testimony in the present proceeding, and
(2) the party against whom the statement is offered is afforded an
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.
McCormick, The TurncoatWitness, 25 TExAs L. P~v. 573, 588 (1947).
Professor McCormick's rule was adopted in Wisconsin in Gelhaar v. State,
41 Wis.2d 280, 168 N.W.2d 609 (1969).
Judge Finch would also allow video-taped statements to be admitted as
substantive evidence. 491 S.W.2d at 538. On the admissibility of video tape evidence, see Conrad, Evidence-Admission of Video Tape, 38 Mo. L. R.v. 111
(1973).
Although Judge Finch endorsed Professor
McCormick's rule, 491 S.W.2d at
537, he nevertheless would have reversed the conviction. Purely oral statements
made by the witness, not coming under the McCormick rule, were admitted into
evidence. 491 S.W.2d at 538. This constituted reversible error.
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Granberry restates the Missouri rule regarding the substantive use of
prior inconsistent statements. Nevertheless, the multiple opinions delivered
may indicate a more analytical approach to the problem and herald possible
change in the law. In view of the argument that prior statements should
not be excluded by the hearsay rule and considering the additional
indicia of their reliability, the unorthodox rule suggested by Professor
McCormick 9 and endorsed by Judge Finch in Granberry seems to be the
better reasoned rule.

WaLLAm F.

49. See note 48 supra.
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